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The elephant in the dispute resolution room:  
Problems with the definition of arbitration in Scots law 
 
In his lecture inaugurating the Law School at Robert Gordon University, 
former Lord President and now practising arbitrator, Lord Hamilton pointed 
out that there is no definition of “arbitration” within Scots law. He said: 
 
“What, then, is arbitration? …it is very difficult to find a modern, 
comprehensive and authoritative definition of the term…So far as I 
am aware, no court in the United Kingdom has, in modern times, 
offered a comprehensive definition of “arbitration”-though, as we 
shall see, there may be some judicial pronouncements which are of 
assistance.”1  
 
It should be said that Scots law is not alone in this respect: there is no 
concise definition of “arbitration” in English law or in most UNCITRAL Model 
Law jurisdictions.  Having said that, each system has its own distinct 
features and while the broad points set out below have resonance beyond 
Scotland – the present focus will be on the key features and issues as they 
impact in Scots law.  
 
It will be seen that, having looked at the way in which arbitration is defined 
in Scots law; there is a dissonance between that definition and the way that 
arbitration operates in practice. A number of issues arise as a result of that 
dissonance and these will be identified and examined. There is an 
opportunity for Scots law to resolve this issue and that too will be looked at 
and discussed. 
                                      
Thanks to Lord Hamilton for his kind review and comments on an earlier draft of 
this article and for letting me have a pre-publication copy of his lecture to the 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators on 27 March 2015. Thank you as well as to Dr 
Andrey Kotelnikov and Dr Joseph Mante. Thank you also to Information 
Management Masters student, Ruth Montague for her help in tracking down some 
of the information referred to.  
1 Extract published in Journal of the Law Society of Scotland, 16 June 2014 and 
full text available at: 
http://www.axiomadvocates.com/newsitem/240/lord_hamilton_-
_rgu_inaugural_lecture_-_arbitration_in_scotland__its_nature_and_its_future 
(accessed 12 January 2015) (“Hamilton Lecture”) 
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The elephant in the room 
 
In terms of the purported lack of definition of “arbitration” in Scots law, a 
survey of the relevant literature does not suggest that the lack of clear 
definition is the cause for undue concern – and the general response to this 
question by the standard textbooks in this area2 is to sketch out some of 
the key features and incidents of arbitration: rather than attempt too 
detailed a definition. An attempt to describe arbitration calls to mind a 
parable about  a group of blind men trying to describe an elephant. Each 
man was able to describe the bit of the elephant closest to him in relateable 
terms but, as a group, they could describe no more than a room which 
contained a rope (in actual fact the tail); spears (the tusks)  a snake (the 
trunk) a wall (the elephant’s side) and so on. Finding a way to capture the 
whole image was impossible. An elephant is something that you know when 
you see but difficult to identify by description beforehand.  
 
Unless the parties know what they are faced with, then they might well 
struggle to work it out for themselves. This presents them with risks if 
dealing with an elephant – and, as we will see, in dealing with arbitration.  
 
Scots law has missed an opportunity to distinguish itself from other 
jurisdictions by not harnessing the recent reform of the law of arbitration in 
Scotland to make the position of arbitration clear. It did not deal with the 
elephant in the room. 
 
An opportunity missed 
 
The lack of definition may have been a missed opportunity since (i) the 
existing definition – such as it is - does not meet the expectations of parties 
(ii) the changing face of non court (“alternative”) dispute resolution may 
lead to difficulties in distinguishing the different processes in law and (iii) 
                                      
2 See for example Davidson, Arbitration (2nd Ed 2012) Sweet and Maxwell 
Chapter 2 and Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration (2nd Ed 1989) Butterworths 
– pp 38 to 52.  
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the lack of definition will impact on how the people appointed as arbitrators 
see themselves – and treat the process.  
 
In what follows, the definitions of arbitration and the image of the arbitrator 
as they currently stand in Scots law will be looked at. 
 
This will be followed by a suggestion as to how the position in Scotland, at 
least, could evolve and how such an evolution would help resolve some of 
the problems identified above.  
 
Where are we now? The definition of arbitration 
 
Acknowledging in his lecture that there was no “official” definition, Lord 
Hamilton identified three possible definitions as follows. 
Firstly, Professor Davidson had “tentatively” defined arbitration as: 
 
“….a process  whereby two or more parties agree to submit a legal 
dispute to one or more third parties, whose role it is to pronounce 
judicially on that dispute in the shape of a binding award”.3 
 
Secondly, Erskine’s definition of the analogous process of “submission” 
(which is broadly the same as arbitration) was as follows: 
 
“…. a contract, entered into by two or more parties, who have 
debateable rights or claims against one another, by which they refer 
their differences to the final determination of an arbiter or arbiters, 
and oblige themselves to acquiesce in their decision” 4 
 
Notwithstanding that the different definitions arise from wholly different 
eras, it is worth noting that there is remarkably little difference between 
the two definitions.  Having said that, there is a significant difference in one 
crucial aspect, which will become clear from the following.  
                                      
3 See n.1 for reference to Hamilton Lecture and reference to Davidson para. 2-01.  
4 N.1 for Hamilton Lecture and Erskine Institute of the Law of Scotland IV.3.29 
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Thirdly, while there is no complete definition of arbitration in the case law 
when looking at the question of whether a third party charged with resolving 
a dispute was immune from suit, a number of criteria emerged which could 
be applied to arbitration – acting as indicators of the sorts of factors which 
ought to be applied.  
 
The leading case on this question was Arenson5 which set out the following: 
 
“(a) there is a dispute or a difference between the parties which 
has been formulated in some way or another;  
 
(b) the dispute or difference has been remitted by the parties to 
the person to resolve in such a manner that he is called on to 
exercise a judicial function;  
 
(c) where appropriate, the parties must have been provided with 
an opportunity to present evidence and/or submissions in 
support of their respective claims in the dispute; and  
 
(d) the parties have agreed to accept his decision.” 
 
It is interesting that – although not directly linked to the definition of 
arbitration; the four grounds are broadly similar to those identified above. 
The primary difference is the third, ground (c) (“(c) where appropriate, the 
parties must have been provided with an opportunity to present evidence 
and/or submissions in support of their respective claims in the dispute”). 
As will be seen below, deciding where this is “ appropriate” can be tricky.  
 
These three definitions bring out broadly the same propositions as follows. 
For arbitration, the following criteria may be applied: 
 
                                      
5 Arenson v Casson Beckley Rutley and Co. [1977] AC 405 
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(i) An obligation, usually in the form of an agreement6 (between 
at least two parties) to resolve a  dispute by arbitration  
(ii) A dispute (covered by the terms of the agreement) needs to 
involve “legal” issues (namely those which it seems would 
require the recognition or vindication of rights in some way, 
and the consequences of that) 
(iii) Referral of this dispute to a third party for a decision. 
(iv) This decision will be binding on the parties in dispute.  
(v) The mode of this decision will either be a ‘determination’ or a 
‘judicial pronouncement’.  
 
Point (v) is expressed with alternatives because this is the key source of 
difficulty in the understanding of Scottish arbitration. Davidson identifies 
the judicial quality of the process as “perhaps the defining characteristic of 
arbitration”  7 
 
However, the distinction between Davidson’s definition and that in Erskine 
on this point serves to identify an apparent tension in the Scottish case law 
where the boundaries of arbitration have been considered.  
 
This is very important because it impacts on the fundamental approach to 
be taken by the person who is deciding the dispute. Moreover, it identifies 
one of the key differences between the various forms of alternative dispute 
resolution. The difference in word may not appear much but at the very 
least it operates as a shorthand to distinguish variations in approach to the 
role of the decision maker in a dispute. Simply put, what is the difference 
between their acting in a judicial capacity and their making a determination?   
 
“Determination” v Judicial Pronouncement 
 
                                      
6 It is recognised that such obligations may also be imposed by legislation (again 
see Hamilton Lecture at n.1) 
7 Davidson para. 2.03 
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In broad terms, therefore, we see that there is probably a reasonable 
settled definition of arbitration in Scots law – save for one significant issue 
and that is the the ambiguity in the idea of an arbitrator’s “judicial” quality.  
 
At first blush, this may not seem a particular problem. Intuitively,8 since 
arbitration is widely considered to be a form of private litigation;9 the idea 
that an arbitrator has a “judge-like” quality seems entirely appropriate.  
  
Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that the meaning of “judicial” as 
discussed in the case law is unclear; rather there seems to be a difference 
in the way in which case law treats the operation of arbitration and the way 
in which arbitration is often carried out in practice.  
 
The confidentiality of arbitration makes it difficult to assess this too closely 
but there are significant pointers in this direction – which chime with the 
writer’s own perception drawing from time in private practice. This 
dissonance between law and practice causes a number of problems which 
will be discussed below. Initially, however, it will be necessary to examine 
the issue in a bit more detail.  
 
There a number of important preliminary points which need to be brought 
out at this point. Firstly, the discussion of the definition of arbitration in 
Scots law has largely taken place in the context of discussions in court about 
whether a procedure which has been followed was operating as an 
arbitration or as an expert determination, for reasons which will be 
discussed below. The definition of arbitration has been discussed above and 
in some detail (and will continue to be discussed below).  
 
The standard textbook on Expert Determination opens with the definition 
“Expert Determination is a means by which parties to a contract jointly 
instruct a third party to decide an issue between them” 10 
                                      
8 Thanks to Dr Andrey Kotelnikov for highlighting this particular point. 
9 See for example para 8 of the Scottish Civil Justice Council’s Access to Justice 
Literature Review: Alternative Dispute Resolution in Scotland and other 
jurisdictions (2014)  - “Arbitration operates like a privatised court system” 
10 Kendall, Freedman and Farrell Expert Determination (4th Ed. 2008) at p.1  
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It will be quickly apparent that this seems broadly similar to the definition 
of arbitration – and the authors of the standard textbook acknowledge this 
early on in their book.11 A precise survey of the scope of the differences 
between the two methods is beyond the scope of the present article but for 
present purposes it is enough to recognise that there are likely to be 
overlaps. For present purposes, drawing on the word which Erskine used – 
and the overall references to expert determination – the alternative to a 
“judicial approach” will be known as “determination.” 
 
This contrast was expressed most clearly in the case of MacDonald Estates 
PLC v National Car Parks Ltd12 where it was said by Lord Reed in the Inner 
House: 
 
“Expert determination, in particular, can be broadly distinguished 
from arbitration in not being judicial in character … A person who sits 
in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, as an arbitrator ordinarily does, 
decides matters on the basis of submissions and evidence put before 
them, whereas an expert, subject to the provisions of their remit, is 
entitled to carry out their own investigations and come to their own 
conclusion regardless of any submission or evidence”13 
 
The way in which “judicial” is characterised here would appear to be based 
on the traditional idea that Scottish civil justice has been based on the 
‘adversarial’ model of proceedings. In this model, the judge essentially acts 
as a referee during the process ensuring fairness between the parties in 
dispute and making his decision based on the information put before him 
by the parties. In particular, as was confirmed in the earlier case of Sutcliffe 
v Thakrah:   
 
“judicial duties do not include investigations” 14 
                                      
11 Ibid p. 2 
12 2009 CSIH 79A 
13 Ibid at. para. 21 
14 Sutcliffe v Thakrah [1974] AC 727 at 735 – and see McMillan and Wilson infra. 
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There is an alternative paradigm of dispute resolution – which is an 
inquisitorial system where the decision maker is not removed from the 
process in the same way but is responsible for conducting investigations 
themselves and engaging with the material – using their own analyses and 
so on. It seems that this might be the model which is applied to expert 
determination in the MacDonald Estates case.  
 
Matters are not, however, that simple. MacDonald Estates recognises that 
the “boundary” between arbitration and expert determination “can be 
difficult to draw”.  The reference to a ‘judical function’ hides ambiguity about 
the role of the arbitrator within Scottish law – especially at a time when 
more interventionist and inquisitorial approaches are found in the growing 
preference for case management in Scottish civil litigation and legislation – 
especially in commercial actions. 
 
It is therefore necessary to examine, in a bit more detail, where the 
boundary might be drawn.  
 
Drawing the boundary 
 
Essentially, on the basis of the ruling in MacDonald Estates, the question is 
whether the third party is drawing on their own opinion (essentially 
following an inquisitorial route) or whether they are coming to a judgement 
based on the parties’ competing views (essentially adversarial).  
 
The number of previous cases on this point vouch for the point that this 
distinction is not always clearly drawn in practice and changes made by the 
new Act may serve to muddy the waters further.  
 
In terms of exploring this issue further, McMillan and Wilson have helpfully 
captured useful ways in which this distinction can be identified in practice 
such as, 
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“A useful tool in determining whether a third party is an expert or an 
arbiter, therefore, can be to analyse how much information she has 
been presented with by each party to the contract, and whether the 
parties have put forward an opinion as to what their preferred 
…[position]… would be”15 
 
This chimes with the broader view taken in a recent work by a leading 
expert in arbitration, Jan Paulsson. In his book, “The Idea of Arbitration” he 
says: 
 
“National laws rarely (if indeed ever) contain general definitions of 
arbitration. Rather, they define specific features which are relevant 
to the effectiveness of contractual arrangements for the resolution of 
disputes…We thus derive our understanding of the mechanics of 
arbitration by observing what the parties do voluntarily”16 
 
Apart from looking at the way the parties, and arbitrator, have approached 
the process, there are other significant issues involved. The primary one is, 
of course, the parties’ contract. It is from which the jurisdiction of the 
arbitrator and/or the expert determiner flows. It might be supposed that 
this would make the position clear. However, the principal issue which 
arises from the cases (and which is discussed by McMillan and Wilson17) is 
that while courts may give a great deal of weight to the terms of the 
contract; they do not treat the terms of the contract as conclusive. In the 
absence of clear definitions of what is involved in each of the terms 
(arbitrator and expert), it is therefore difficult to identify what the 
contractual ramifications of either might be.  
 
Essentially, then, when asked to assess what form of procedure has been 
followed, the courts can only do so with the benefit of hindsight taking the 
contract as a piece of evidence as to the parties broader intentions which 
                                      
15 McMillan and Wilson Experts and Arbiters: Ne’er the twain shall meet?  2008 JR 
273 at 275 
16 Paulsson The Idea of Arbitration (2013) (OUP) at p.19 
17 Op. Cit – n. 15 at p. 279 
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can also be gleaned from their conduct in the process. This is unsatisfactory 
since there is such a wide range of events which can put the position into 
doubt.  
 
The consequences of this are significant in terms of the distinction between 
arbitration and expert determination. They fall into two broad categories 
which are termed here as practical and moral. They also impact on broader 
questions in the law relating to alternative dispute resolution.  
 
Issues at the boundary between arbitration and expert 
determination 
 
Practical issues 
 
The specific practical issues are as follows. The first two have been drawn 
out of McMillan and Wilson’s work.18  
 
1. Challenges to awards/decisions. There are set routes for challenge to 
the arbitral award -  which, although circumscribed, are set out 
clearly. Challenges to expert decisions are generally much harder to 
sustain. Breaches of natural justice or exceeding jurisdiction are the 
most common but they can be difficult to prosecute where the expert 
is given significant discretion. 
 
2. Liability of decision maker. As is seen from the above, the arbitrator 
is immune from suit. Lord Hamilton points out that, in Arenson, that 
distinction was doubted – but it remains in place. An expert is not – 
by default – unless provision is made in the contract (and even then 
that is likely to create some nervousness on the part of the expert). 
 
3. Freedom of procedure. The Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 – and in 
particular the mandatory and default rules in the Schedule to that 
                                      
18 Ibid. p.285ff 
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Act – apply to all Scottish arbitrations. There is no such constraint on 
the process of expert determination.  
 
4. The access to the power of the state. Linked to this is the question 
of whether the state apparatus can be used to enforce the decision 
or not. Arbitral awards are enforceable using the same mechanisms 
as court judgements and, if the award is made in a state which is 
party to the New York Convention – enforceable internationally. 
Those other forms of dispute resolution which only flow from parties’ 
agreement, such as expert determination, do not engage the 
apparatus of the state in this way –or have the same transferability 
in terms of enforcement.  
 
5. Avoiding court. ADR, almost by definition, seeks to avoid court 
processes. The greater the ambiguity as to the process being 
followed – the more likely that a court will be required to intervene 
to resolve it.  
 
 
‘Moral’ issues 
 
Beyond this are issues of legal principle. Firstly, a decision on the type of 
dispute resolution ought not to be drawn from an ex post facto assessment 
of what has happened. It should be clear at the outset – especially standing 
the practical issues identified above, what process is being followed. 
Moreover, Paulsson identifies one of the key ideas in arbitration and one 
which by extension applies to all forms of ADR as being “freedom”19 
meaning that parties have the possibility to choose the means of resolving 
their dispute. In line with that, it ought to be clear that the parties ought to 
get the procedure and outcomes which they had bargained for.  
 
Beyond that, secondly, there is of course the position of the person charged 
with resolving the dispute. He might have a different conception of the role 
being thrust upon him – and can change the interpretation of the position 
                                      
19 Op. Cit. Paulsson at pp 1 and 2  
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through his own conduct. While the parties can of course seek to correct his 
course, pragmatism may favour keeping the arbitrator on side. In any 
event, the result of this may be that the actions of the parties at a time of 
dispute may well not meet the spirit of their consensus at the time of 
agreeing the contract.  
 
Thirdly, linked to the second, there is also an important question regarding 
the role of the arbitrator and the identity the take for themselves. There is 
a desire to progress arbitration expeditiously – certainly to keep it away 
from the formal structures of court litigation. However, much of making that 
desire a reality will fall on the arbitrator as the person with the final say on 
the process – as such, as Lord Hamilton captured: “Much may depend on 
the personal authority of the arbitrator or arbitrators to progress matters.”20 
 
That personal authority is likely to be weakened if its boundaries are not 
clearly defined. Certainly, if he is to follow the role of a judge as outlined in 
MacDonald Car Parks, it would be more difficult to pursue matters 
expeditiously. If he takes a more direct role, he falls into the risk of straying 
over the boundary identified.  
 
Four broader problems 
 
There are four broader problems with the existing distinction. Firstly, it does 
not reflect the idea of what arbitration is; secondly, it does not reflect the 
practice of arbitration in Scotland; thirdly, it does not reflect the terms of 
the 2010 Act and fourthly, the lack of clarity is storing up problems for the 
future.  
 
First problem: “The idea of arbitration” 
  
One of the key issues is that the distinction around the approach to the 
meaning of the arbitrator’s “judicial” function may not chime with what 
                                      
20 Hamilton Op. Cit.  
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parties (including potential arbitrators) generally understand the role of 
arbitration to be.  
 
Paulsson makes three observations which frame this idea and serve to set 
the scene. He canvasses the view of how people imagine the archetypal 
arbitrator. Three observations are particularly pertinent – because they go 
to the idea of the arbitrator that emerges from the case law. Those 
observations are: 
 
“Parties can trust the arbitrator to get to the bottom of the thing, to 
identify and to consider all the reasons…why one feels the other is in 
the wrong”21 
 
“Getting to the bottom of the thing” seems to suggest a higher degree of 
intervention that the netural referee which the Scottish case law suggests 
is encompassed by the meaning of “judicial”.  Paulsson goes on:  
 
“Above all, parties are attracted to arbitration because it promises a 
resolution of their dispute…To resolve has a richer meaning than to 
hear or even ‘to decide’” 22 
 
Again, the concept of an arbitrator seems to require more than neutrality. 
Finally:  
 
“The idea of arbitration is above all at a great remove from some 
features of the imagined judicial temperament” 23 
 
In this he includes features such as an impersonal attitude and an 
indifference to the parties. Instead, it suggests a more proactive and 
positive engagement with the parties as well as the issues.  
 
                                      
21 Paulsson Op. Cit. p. 8 
22 Ibid. p.17 
23 Ibid. p.9 
14 
 
These three ideas suggest someone who is not sitting above the arbitrator 
but being more involved in the process.  Paulsson is speaking from an 
international perspective but it seems from what follows that these ideas 
apply to Scots as much as anyone.  
 
Second problem: Arbitration in practice 
 
In Scottish case law, this desire for more interventionist approaches has 
manifested itself in the disputes about whether the ‘arbitrator’ was acting 
as an arbitrator or an expert (with the consequences set out above). One 
explanation for these cases is that they flow from parties and 
arbitrators/experts pushing at the boundaries of the court imposed 
paradigm on how their process is to operate. That parties are approaching 
disputes as arbitration – even when they do not fit the “judicial” paradigm 
described in MacDonald Estates – supports the ideas of Paulsson that they 
are looking for something more. 
 
That this is an ongoing issue is seen in the more recent decision in 
Arbitration Reference No. 1 of 2013 [2014] CSOH 83.  
 
This case is particularly noteworthy in the present context as it is decided 
under the new Act. Specific issues with that Act will be discussed in the 
context of our “third problem” below but for present purposes, it is worth 
highlighting the approach from the parties – as an approach which chimes 
with other cases “at the boundary” and the remarks of Paulsson above.  
 
It seems clear from the judgement in this case that the arbitrator was 
actively involved in the conduct of the proceedings (and indeed this was 
one of the bases of the challenge which gave rise to the decision). It is 
worth tracing this through the reasoning in the case, as follows.  
 
A number of grounds for challenge of the arbitrator’s decision were 
advanced. For present puposes, the most significant of these was that the 
arbitrator had acted as an expert and not as an arbitrator. The basis for this 
challenge was not altogether clear since it seems to have been expressed 
15 
 
as being under rule 68(1). This provision merely provides that a decision 
can be challenged on the basis of ‘serious irregularity’. It is followed by a 
list of the grounds for ‘serious irregularity’ but none is enumerated in the 
decision in this case.  
 
In any event, the judge was content that there was no valid challenge here. 
Saying in respect of the question of whether the arbitrator acted as an 
expert (emphasis added):  
 
“The lease envisages that the parties intended any rent review 
arbitration to be a practical exercise carried out quickly by an 
experienced surveyor…and that the arbitration should be completed 
within one month (although that did not occur here). The 
arbitrator would be expected to deploy his knowledge in 
arriving at his decision. My conclusion is reinforced by the parties' 
submissions. They are couched in language designed to speak to 
another professional with expertise in the field. I see nothing within 
the award to indicate that the arbitrator stepped beyond his role.” 24 
 
The highlighted phrases illustrate that the arbitrator was acting as the 
principal figure in resolving the dispute – but this seem to be at odds from 
the more neutral judicial figure envisaged in the case law. Indeed, it seems 
that the judge was content to allow the arbitrator to deal with matters as 
he saw fit, where he said: 
 
“The arbitrator’s task was to exercise his professional judgement to 
arrive at the correct figure. Indeed he might find it startling to be 
told that the task he under took bristled with so many legal 
problems.” 25 
 
Both of these quotes seem to discount the possibility that the arbitrator 
would not have the key role in actually working out the answer (aside from 
                                      
24 Arbitration Reference No. 1 of 2013 [2014] CSOH 83 at para. 21 
25 Ibid. at para 28 
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simply determining it) – rather than simply judging between competing 
submissions.  
 
Now, it may be that the parties’ contract was clear on this (and Lord 
Woolman does put some weight on the terms of the lease in the first quote 
noted above) – we are not told; but it seems in any event that this process 
was conducted with more emphasis on intervention than the “judicial” 
model suggested in MacDonald Estates. Despite this, there was no 
argument run – at least on the evidence of the judgement – that this 
process was anything but an arbitration.  
 
In the context of the other case law, it would seem that there is at least a 
fairly common approach to arbitration which imagines it as something more 
interventionist and inquisitorial than the “judicial” model set out in 
MacDonald Estates.  
 
It might be argued that the present case, Arbitration Reference No. 1 of 
2013, can be distinguished on the basis that it post dates the Act but the 
similarity of approach by parties whether taking action before or after the 
Act’s coming into force that that was not a key factor. Moreover, there was 
no discussion of any differences of approach which might have arisen as a 
result of the new legal regime in the judgement in this case.  
 
Instead, it is suggested that this case evidences an approach and practice 
which reflects that which is found in the pre-2010 cases.  
 
Third problem: Storing up trouble in the wider ADR context  
 
Beyond the issues in Scots law, the lack of definition is also important to 
the operation of a variety of other forms of ADR operating in the present 
legal universe – some of which have greater overlap with arbitration. The 
discussion above has looked at difficulties in Scots law of distinguishing two 
long standing and generally well understood processes – arbitration and 
expert determination. 
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Beyond those two procedures, however, there is the spectrum of mediation 
and conciliation where the “mediator” can become progressively more of 
the decision maker, with the parties agreement. In addition, there are 
hybrids of those various processes, such as dispute boards which sit in 
major projects and – with varying degrees of formality – can assist parties 
in resolving their disputes as they arise. There are a host of others. 
 
The idea that parties might stray from one to another as a result of the 
proceedings not meeting particular criteria would be dangerous and with 
potentially unintended consequences. At the same time, the novelty of 
these forms; combined with the very fact that they discourage court 
proceedings, means that their definitions – and distinctions from arbitration 
– are not even as developed as those for expert determination and 
arbitration.  
 
If one looks at the definitions of arbitration set out above, it might be 
possible to carve out some of these mechanisms from it – the decision might 
not be “binding”; there might not be a “dispute” constituted within the usual 
definition of the law – and so on. That, however, requires a definition of 
arbitration in the first place.  
 
It may well prove that the lack of a clear definition of the various concepts 
might pose problems in the future.  
 
For these reasons, it might have been hoped that a definition of arbitration 
could be found in the 2010 Act – but the position arising from there is far 
from clear.  
 
Fourth problem: the terms of the 2010 Act 
 
The Arbitration (Scotland) Act has created further scope for confusion.  
 
The passage of the then Arbitration (Scotland) Bill through the Scottish 
Parliament and the passage of MacDonald Estates through the Scottish 
courts seems to have happened in broad parallel (with the decision of the 
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court arriving at its conclusion first). 26 However, it does not seem that there 
was any reference to the other in these parallel processes – which is 
perhaps unfortunate in the context of the issues identified in this article and 
in particular the fact that there may now be a tension between the common 
law definition and the way in which arbitration is set out in the Act.  
 
“Tension” is used because the Act, as mentioned above, does not include 
any formal definition of arbitration. Instead, there are inferences which 
might be drawn from some of the wording. Those inferences are only 
arguably irreconcilable with the position set out in the case law – which 
leaves the whole position somewhat unclear.  
 
This lack of clarity is particularly troubling given the role of the state in 
facilitating arbitration (as set out above). Beyond that, the state has an 
important role in the way in which arbitration is understood27 - even 
compared to other forms of ADR.  
 
Given that situation, it is strange that the state’s position is not clear in the 
underlying legal regime.  
 
Before going further, it is necessary to briefly sketch out the position. The 
2010 Act contains, in the main body of the Act, a series of rules to give 
authority and substance to arbitration which have their “seat” in Scotland 
(essentially, those which can – taking account of the complex rules, be 
described as “Scottish” Arbitrations). The Schedule to the Act contains a 
series of procedural provisions called the Scottish Arbitration Rules. These 
make up a complete set of rules which can be followed in Scottish 
arbitrations. These rules fall into two camps: one set are mandatory rules 
and the other set are “default” rules. Mandatory rules apply to all ‘Scottish’ 
                                      
26 See details on 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/16034.aspx 
(accessed 23 February 2015) 
27 Davidson Op. Cit. at paras 2.11 to 2.16 contains a useful, brief summary of the 
various theories of the foundations of arbitration.  
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arbitrations and default rules only apply where the parties have not agreed 
something to the contrary. 28 
 
In terms of how this impacts on the way in which arbitrations in Scotland 
are conducted (and therefore on the essence of Scottish arbitration), the 
position is as follows.  
 
Firstly, mandatory provisions in Rules 24 and 25 provide that that the 
arbitrator and the parties have duties to conduct proceedings without 
“unnecessary delay” and without “unnecessary expense.”  
 
This appears to require some degree of “proactivity” on the part of all 
parties. Of itself this would reflect a departure – at least in emphasis – from 
the “judicial function” described above. However, since these duties must 
be balanced against the other requirements that the arbitrator allows 
parties to put its case and treats them fairly, this is not perhaps too radical. 
Indeed, there can be tension between the need for fairness and the need 
to control the process. This is not, however, made clear.  
 
Combined with this, the Rules also provide further detail on the arbitrator’s 
potential powers in Rule 28. These rules are default rules and so can be 
changed by the parties’ agreement.  
 
These rules provide the arbitrator with broad scope over the procedure.  
 
They begin  
 
“28(1) It is for the tribunal to determine—  
 
(a) the procedure to be followed in the arbitration, and  
(b) the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any    
evidence.  
  
                                      
28 See Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 – sections 8 and 9 
20 
 
(2) In particular, the tribunal may determine…” 
 
The Rules go on to provide a number of specific powers which the tribunal 
(i.e. the arbitrator or arbitrators) can determine for themselves. Crucially 
for present purposes, these include the power (in Rule 28(2)(e)) for the 
arbitrator to determine “whether and, if so, to what extent the tribunal 
should take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law”. 
 
This power is a repeat of a very similarly worded provision in the English 
Arbitration Act 1996.29 In both pieces of legislation, it is commonly 
described as giving the arbitrator scope to exercise an ‘inquisitorial’ role.30 
 
The precise content of that role is problematic in the context of the 
differentiation between arbitration and expert determination set out by Lord 
Reed in MacDonald Estates.  
 
It may, of course, be said that the 2010 Act changes the law – legislation 
trumps common law, of course.  
 
However, there are four points which might suggest that that is not the 
case. Firstly, if that was intended to change the law, then it ought to have 
been made clearer and more explicit. This change, if there is one, is found 
in a sub-subsection to a rule found half way through a schedule to the 
Act(however central that schedule might be) – that would not seem to be 
the prime position for such a change.  
 
Secondly, the nature of the rules involved is different. The sub rule relates 
to the procedure which the arbitrator might adopt and follow, rather than 
striking at the nature of the arbitrator’s function which, at least arguably, 
is what is described in MacDonald Estates.  
 
                                      
29 S.34(2)(g) 
30 See for example Harris, Planterose and Tecks The Arbitration Act 1996: A 
Commentary (5th Ed. 2014) at 34K 
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Thirdly, the extent to which an arbitrator can take the initiative is unclear. 
The same wording exists in the English Arbitration Act of 1996.31 While the 
Scottish courts have been clear that English authority can be used to help 
interpret equivalent provisions in the Scottish Act32 that does not fully 
answer the question. The purpose of the provision has been understood in 
England to allow the arbitrator to act inquisitorially33 but the provision itself 
does not, obviously, express itself in terms of the distinction between 
adversarial and inquisitorial. Moreover, even in England there is doubt 
about the extent to which that provision allows the arbitrator to be proactive 
– it seems to be accepted that, even there, it is at least good practice to 
not stray too far from adversarial procedures, at least without the parties 
consent.34 
 
Fourthly, if an arbitrator is to be empowered to hold an inquisition then this 
has the potential to “crowd out” expert determination from the options 
available to a party – the distinction between the processes becomes less 
clear. 
 
There are, therefore, problems in reconciling the provision with Scottish 
law.  
 
It must be said that there are benefits to rule 28(2)(e). It  allows the 
arbitrator to move away, if appropriate, from the strictness of the position 
as set out in terms of judicial function in MacDonald Estates and closer to 
the more “proactive” approach which is recognised in the case law and by 
Paulsson above: 
 
                                      
31 S34(2)(g) 
32 See e.g. Arbitration Application No.3 of 2011 [2011] CSOH 164 per Lord 
Glennie at para.8 
33 see St John Sutton, Gill, Gearing Russell on Arbitration (23rd Edition, 2007) at 
para. 5.099 
34 See. Aeberli The Tribunal in the Driving Seat: Inquisitorial Procedures in 
Adjudication and Arbitration A paper given to the Society of Construction Law 
December 2005 D61 at p.21 (with reference to Mustill and Boyd Commercial 
Arbitration 2nd Ed. 1989, pp 288 – 289).  
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That has the benefit of aligning the powers of the arbitrator with practice – 
but the problems with the underlying lack of clarity about the arbitrator’s 
fundamental role which are discussed here, remain: the boundary between 
expert determination remains unclear. In addition, since the approach to be 
taken by the arbitrator is to be determined by the arbitrator (at least by 
default) that weakens the role of the parties agreement regarding the 
nature of the process they are seeking to deploy to resolve their dispute.  
 
At the very least, although the powers allowed in the 2010 Act do help in 
aligning the law with practice – issues remain. There are however ways in 
which these difficulties might be resolved.  
 
Possible solutions 
 
There a number of possible solutions. 
 
Firstly, Paulsson suggests that freedom for the parties to the process is at 
the heart of arbitration35 – and let the definition of their procedures, as 
agreed by the parties rule the day. That has the benefit of allowing the 
parties freedom of choice. As a proposition, that is attractive and has some 
force – but it would pose a number of logistical difficulties and might leave 
the position open to misinterpretation. In Scots law, the lack of clarity in 
the overall legal framework and the different outcomes in terms of immunity 
of the decision maker and in terms of the avenues of appeal, mean that a 
lack of definition ends up constraining choice: the parties agreement is not 
capable of clear implementation.  
 
The key is ensuring that the outcomes and parameters of the various 
processes ought to be clear – especially for arbitration in which the state 
also has a role to play.  
 
If the baselines are clear and the parties agree it, it ought to be relatively 
easy to define the process they want: they will know what “arbitration” 
                                      
35 See e.g. Op. Cit. Chapter 9 
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means and can set up their process accordingly. In the absence of that 
clarity, then there is the scope for difficulty. 
 
Another alternative might simply be to carve out a separate form of 
arbitration specific to rent reviews – it is noteworthy that cases which have 
traversed the boundary between arbitration and expert determination have 
generally come from that area. This would leave arbitration “proper” in the 
more rarefied, “quasi-judicial” position envisaged in MacDonald Estates. 
The difficulty with that solution is that it does not deal with the issues which 
Paulsson captures neatly and which are discussed above which imagines 
that the arbitrator is more than a “private judge” – but someone with more 
control over the proceedings.  
 
The question, therefore, is how to define the extent of that control but retain 
the distinction – which has been made in the law - between “judicial” 
arbitration and expert determination.  
 
Leaving it only to the choice of the parties would be the preference but the 
language and terminology used must be clear before this can be done. The 
difficulty then is to reconcile law and practice. An attempt to do so follows.    
 
Construction Adjudication: hybrid solutions?  
 
Over the last fifteen years or so, hundreds of cases in the UK centred on 
the role of a dispute resolving decision maker who sits within what could 
comfortably be described as a hybrid role between arbitrator and expert. 
This is the role of the construction “adjudicator”.  
 
The role of the construction “adjudicator” was put on a statutory footing for 
“construction contracts” (as defined) by s108 of the Housing Grants, 
Construction and Regeneration Act 1996.36  
 
                                      
36 As now amended by sections 138 to 141 of the Local Democracy, Economic 
Development and Construction Act 2009  
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In essence, within the parameters of the statutory framework, an 
adjudicator’s role has broadly similar features to both arbitration and expert 
determination as characterised above. The most striking feature of the 
process – and its biggest difference from other forms of dispute resolution 
- is that it imposes a 28 day deadline for the reaching of a decision on the 
adjudicator, and only relatively limited scope for that to be extended. In an 
environment where a resolution within 28 months is otherwise far from 
unusual, that is a significant feature.   
 
The precise conceptual nature of adjudication is unclear but in Scotland, it 
has been said that construction adjudication is a “species of arbitration.”37 
This is to the extent that  
 
“It involves a procedure whereby parties agree to submit their 
dispute to the decision of a named individual rather than resort to 
court proceedings. That agreement may be found in an express 
adjudication clause in the parties' contract, or such a provision may 
be implied by the Housing Grants Regeneration and Construction Act 
1996. However the agreement to go to adjudication is created, 
however, the critical features of an arbitration are present. The only 
distinction is that an adjudicator's award is merely provisional, and 
may be undone by subsequent litigation or arbitration.”38  
 
It is notable that this case defines adjudication as similar to arbitration 
largely by reference to the fact that the submission of a dispute to an 
individual following parties agreement (albeit in the case of adjudication 
this agreement is implied (or perhaps more accurately “imposed”) by the 
legislation).  
 
Going beyond that similarity, which exists on the face of the process, it 
should be said that while the links between arbitration and adjudication are 
recognised, there are some question marks around issues such as the 
                                      
37 Deko Scotland Limited v. Edinburgh Royal Joint Venture and Others [2003] SLT 
727 at para. 9 
38 Ibid 
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possibility of making claims against adjudicators39 (it will be recalled that 
arbitrators have immunity). More generally some commentators have 
voiced their concern that the process has become more formal and legalistic 
than it was first intended to be.40 In that latter sense, it might be said that 
the use of “judicial” (in the context of arbitration) might be an accurate 
term in the sense that it conveys a sense of formality and weight to 
proceedings – rather than something more “rough and ready”. In any event, 
the distinction between arbitration and adjudication is the subject for 
another day.  
 
For present purposes, it is appropriate to note that adjudication shares 
features with arbitration and expert determination and that adjudication 
has been a significant success. It can be said that it, generally, it appears 
to fulfill the desires of parties. 
 
One of the reasons it does this may be the perception that a construction 
adjudicator is getting involved with the resolution of the dispute – rather 
than simply deciding on the position presented to them. That would mean 
it was meeting the aims and understanding of the parties, as set out above.  
 
For the author of one of the leading textbooks in the field, that is a clear 
point of distinction between adjudication and arbitration:  
 
“The 1996 Act makes clear that the adjudicator’s role is inquisitorial 
and investigatory. It is therefore up to the adjudicator to investigate 
the facts that he considers to be relevant and to arrive at his own 
conclusion as to the answer to the dispute that has arisen. To that 
extent, the process is different to litigation or arbitration which, at its 
simplest, is an adversarial process, at the end of which the judge or 
                                      
39 In particular, there are question marks over whether they can recover their 
fees see the recent decision of Stork Technical Services (RBG) Limited v Ross 
[2015] CSOH 10  
40 See for example the views of Bingham “Construction Act: Super size me” 
Building magazine, 6 January 2014.  
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arbitrator has to choose between the two alternative cases advanced 
before him.” 41 
 
The source of this “inquisitorial” role is contained in the 1996 Construction 
Act (as amended) but will be familiar from what has been discussed above. 
Section 108(2)(f) provides that the construction contract which provides for 
adjudication (or has adjudication implied into it) “shall enable the 
adjudicator to take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law”42 
(and if there is no such provision then a statutory Scheme setting out the 
procedure will apply).  
 
As will be recalled, this echoes the very similar wording in s34(2)(g) of the 
Arbitration Act 1996 and Rule 28(2)(e) of the Scottish Arbitration Rules. In 
the adjudication context, there has been significant consideration of how 
this would operate in practice. While it is beyond the scope of this work to 
go into significant detail on the relevant case law the overall approach to 
be taken appears to be clear.  
 
It is the initiative flowing from s108 of the Construction Act which creates 
the role for the adjudicator to get involved – they must be proactive in 
seeking to identify the issues arising rather than relying on the parties to 
“bring the facts to them”. They set the agenda and seek information. Much 
will rely on the information and submissions given by the parties, of course 
– but the adjudicator controls the process with its ‘initiative’; not just 
reactively.  
 
Coulson notes that there are limits to that inquisitorial role imposed by (i) 
the lack of time which is available to allow any forensic investigation; rather 
a more hands off approach is needed – where the adjudicator is forced by 
circumstances to rely on the information as presented to them and (ii) the 
requirements of natural justice – which prevent the adjudicator from 
                                      
41 Coulson Construction Adjudication 2nd Ed. Oxford at para. 19.28 [new edition 
forthcoming at time of writing] 
42 (s108(2)(f) Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996) 
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reaching conclusions without providing the parties’ opportunities to 
comment on them.43 
 
Notwithstanding those constraints, there have been a number of cases, 
recently, which have looked at the extent of the adjudicator’s proactivity in 
taking the initiative. The adjudicator is responsible for setting the procedure 
to be followed. In terms of the extent to which they can go beyond the 
material provided by the parties, the recent cases have been boiled down 
to the idea that:  
 
“in these adjudications, an adjudicator may come up with his own 
argument, or analysis of the facts or the evidence, or attach 
significance to a contractual term not argued by the parties; the 
adjudicator is not confined to the material and arguments provided 
by the parties”.44 
 
However, there are constraints to this. As Coulson noted, the adjudicator is 
not obliged to go beyond the materials provided and, in accordance with 
the rules of natural justice, parties must be:  
 
“informed by the adjudicator of arguments or analysis which the 
adjudicator has come up with beyond the submissions of the parties, 
and to a reasonable opportunity to comment on that material, before 
the adjudicator reaches a decision on the matter in question”. 45 
 
The time constraints can therefore act against the use of initiative: it can 
take a moment to find a spark of genius, but if that needs to be built into a 
fire and the parties given time to douse the resulting flames: too much of 
the allotted period for adjudication can elapse to make the effort worth the 
candle.  
 
                                      
43 Coulson – page 19.28  
44 Peter Sheridan “Construction Act review: adjudicators using their own 
experience, expertise or argument” [2014] Const LJ 304 at p.322 
45 Ibid. 
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The clear indication from this – and the relevant cases46 - is that the 
constraints of natural justice operated in practice to provide that the 
inquisitorial role is hemmed in by the need to ensure the parties are allowed 
to comment on the information or issues which the adjudicator raises. 
 
In the course of the strictly time limited process of adjudication, the focus 
is on the dispute as captured in the intial documents produced. That also 
operates to constrain the process: there is little scope to expand the issues 
beyond those captured in those initial documents.  
 
In arbitration, where there can be a somewhat more leisurely pace 
(although that is of course a matter for the parties), that could lead to an 
expansion of issues and avenues for exploration. That may simply be a 
feature of an inquisitorial style – but it is unlikely to meet the desires of all 
commercial parties. At the same time, the ability of an inquisitorial decision 
maker to help focus a dispute and manage a process more efficiently can 
be vital to the process.  
 
Adjudication can provide some indication of how to fit an inquisitorial 
approach into the Scottish system and practice. The practical constraints 
on adjudication – especially the time limits which, combined with the 
requirements of natural justice, act as a constraint on the adjudicator’s 
ability to become to “inquisitive” – mean that it is not a straightforward 
solution. However, the case law supporting the role of the adjudicator might 
then offer a path to follow between the adversarial and inquisitorial 
paradigms advanced by Lord Reed in MacDonald Estates.   
 
Solving the problem for arbitration 
 
Adjudication has two lessons which could be applied to assist our 
understanding of arbitration. While the former has clearly been around for 
                                      
46 See e.g. SGL Carbon Fibres Ltd v RBG Ltd 2011 SLT 417 at para. 12 and then 
the discussion of this in context of the facts of the case in paras. 29 to 36.  
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less time than the latter, its novelty combined with a high density of court 
cases has allowed its nature to be explored and developed judicially.  
 
Firstly, there is no definition of “adjudication” in the legislation but the 
nature of the process seems to be clearly enough understood. This is drawn 
from (i) the clear legislative intention to use the process to assist cash flow 
in construction projects and (ii) the procedural framework set out in the 
legislation itself. From that the understanding of adjudication has arisen. 
The parameters and procedures seem to be clearly understood. That is not 
to say that the picture is complete: there is the existing lack of clarity about 
adjudicator immunity, for example which might be more easily filled if there 
was a clear definition. However, the system seems to be well understood 
and operated in practice. 
 
Applying this lesson to Scottish arbitration, therefore, the need to identify 
the purpose and the procedures of arbitration is clear. Helpfully the  2010 
Act does both. From what has been discussed above, there would remain 
the clear issue about the extent to which the arbitrator can adopt an 
“inquisitorial” approach.  However, if one looks at the framework the 
Scottish Arbitration Rules set out, the link with adjudication is clear.  
 
The purposes of arbitration and the role of the arbitrator are made clear in 
Rule 24: 
 
“24(1) The tribunal must— 
(a) be impartial and independent, 
(b) treat the parties fairly, and 
(c) conduct the arbitration— 
(i) without unnecessary delay, and 
(ii) without incurring unnecessary expense. 
 
(2) Treating the parties fairly includes giving each party a 
reasonable opportunity to put its case and to deal with 
the other party's case.”  
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This then echoes the position as now established for adjudication since 
there is a need for some sort of “efficient” dispute resolution – but this 
efficiency must be balanced with fairness – and indeed the express 
requirement for parties to be allowed to comment on the other parties case 
which echoes the natural justice requirement in adjudication.  
 
Interestingly, there is no express requirement for fairness to require the 
arbitrator to allow the parties to comment on any issues raised by the 
arbitrator  
 
However, when the broad framework in Rule 24 is combined with the 
possible powers in Rule 28, the position in construction adjudication can be 
seen as sufficiently analogous – and that allows exploration of the second 
lesson which arbitration can take from adjudication.   
 
The second lesson from adjudication is that the ability for case law 
surrounding the meaning of “taking the initiative in ascertaining the facts 
and the law” to be used. One of the problems is that this language now 
appears in both the Scottish and English arbitration acts, and in the 1996 
Act. It seems to be commonly understood to be bringing in inquisitorial 
powers – but the scope of these powers is not clear. What does seem 
reasonably clear, is that, in terms of construction adjudication at least, the 
words seem to be understood and meet what the parties might be generally 
looking for in their arbitration, in terms of intervention.  
 
However, construction adjudication reflects a specific response to the needs 
in a particular sector. It is purposely structured to maximise cash flow in 
the construction industry.  
 
Arbitration – undefined as it is – is more flexible. In terms of the level of 
intervention, some parties might wish less; some might wish more – there 
are trade-offs in terms of efficiency of the process and opportunities to 
ensure quality control depending on where on the spectrum that is placed. 
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As will have been seen above, that level of intervention goes to the heart 
of the process. It might be said that the issues ought to be left to the 
parties.  
 
That might be the case but of course, at present, it is not: instead the issue 
is left to the arbitrator to determine – and his apparent discretion; unless 
he is an avid follower of the case law47 is wide. At present, he may stray 
into the realm of expert determination – perhaps unwittingly. That ought to 
be avoided. To corrupt the words of Lord Dunedin: If parties have 
contracted to arbitrate, to arbitration – and not expert determination – they 
must go. 
 
In addition, the example of adjudication shows how other procedural 
constraints can matter here. Even the most inquisitive adjudicator has to 
get to his decision in less than a month: the scope for going “off on a frolic” 
is limited.  
 
This again points to the importance of procedure in terms of defining the 
process. As identified above, the difference between adversarial and 
inquisitorial arbitration is made in the case law. The 2010 legislation may 
have changed the position but the extent of that change is unclear. That 
distinction is important for a whole host of reasons.  
 
At present, Rule 28(2)(e) of the Scottish Arbitration Rules is a default rule. 
Parties can therefore modify it as suits them – to either specify the level of 
initiative that can be taken; or provide in other ways to control the scope 
of the arbitrator’s ability to intervene in the proceedings. They should do 
so, however, with a clear view of what they intend to achieve and with the 
consequences of changing the provision clear.  
 
It may be said that the new rule, 28(2)(e) has altered the position, away 
from MacDonald Estates. The arbitrator is no longer purely involved in 
                                      
47 Many arbitrators are, of course, but the other side of the story is that there 
may also be preferences for arbitration where the arbitrator does not have the 
same detailed understanding of the law.  
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adversarial proceedings. It could be argued that the use of the language is 
clear – by its analogues in other legislation at least – that this is to import 
an inquisitorial procedure. In terms of adjudication, however, the operation 
of that role in practice is constrained by other aspects of procedure. 
Moreover, given that the difference is a key one in differentiating arbitration 
from other forms of dispute resolution; if it is no longer in place: what are 
the alternatives?  
 
Much then will depend on the parties’ agreement to the way in which the 
procedure is to be operated both at the time of agreement of the contract 
and later (when it might be that agreement is more difficult).  
 
In that case, it ought to be considered (i) what role the arbitrator is to have 
(ii) what impact other procedural restrictions will have on it and (iii) if it 
ought to be made clear – at least by way of an indication – what procedure 
is being adopted.  
 
 
